) proved existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature. Each agent observes a public and a private signal. The publicly observed signal may take infinitely many values but, in order to get existence, we assume that private signals only take finitely many values. Actually, there is no hope to get a general existence result since Podczeck et al. (Vienna University Working Papers 2008) already proposed non-existence results.
Introduction
For exchange economies under uncertainty, Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved that a competitive equilibrium exists if agents have a complete and symmetric information about a finite set of possible states of nature. Replicating the economy, Debreu and Scarf (1963) proved that the core shrinks to the set of competitive equilibria as the number of consumers becomes infinite. These results were generalized in several directions.
Asymmetric information was introduced by Radner (1968) for competitive markets and by Yannelis (1991) for the study of Pareto optimality and core. Agents arrange contracts at the first period that may be contingent on the realized state of nature at the second period. But after the realization of state, they do not necessarily know which state of nature has actually occurred. Agents have incomplete information and this information may differ across agents (differential information economies). Therefore they are restricted to sign contracts that are compatible with their private information.
For an economy with differential information, Radner defined a notion of competitive equilibrium (Walrasian expectations equilibrium) which is an analogous concept to the Walrasian equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu model with symmetric information. There is an important literature dealing with competitive solutions for differential information exchange economies: Maus (2004) for economies with production and Einy et al. (2001) for large economies with a continuum of agents. 1 All these contributions deal with either a finite dimensional commodity space or with a commodity space for which the positive cone has a non-empty interior.
For models with symmetric information, the existence result in Arrow and Debreu (1954) was generalized to economies with infinitely many states. Since the pathbreaking papers of Peleg and Yaari (1970) and Bewley (1972), many theorems have been proved on the existence of competitive equilibrium with an infinite dimensional commodity space for which the positive cone may have an empty interior. However, nearly all 2 require that the consumption possibility sets are the positive orthant. These results cannot be applied to models with asymmetric information since informationally constrained consumption sets are in general subsets of strict subspaces of the commodity space.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend the existence result in Arrow and Debreu (1954) by considering both asymmetric information and infinitely many states of 1 See also Hervés-Beloso et al. (2005a,b); Einy et al. (2005) ; Graziano and Meo (2005); Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2006 , 2007a and many others. Recently, there has been a resurgent interest on the execution of contracts at the second period. At issue are questions of enforceability. Since information is incomplete, some agents may have incentives to misreport their information and then contracts may not be executable. 
